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Abstract 
Policy conditionality has been a frequently used tool in the context of the Euro zone crisis 
management. By linking the disbursement of loan instalments to specific policy requirements the 
macro-economic adjustment programmes used conditionality as leverage to promote structural 
reforms. 
How does conditionality induce policy change? This central question is examined by considering 
conditionality as a ‘mega’ policy instrument that seeks to guide the domestic policy system and define 
its reform trajectory. Policy conditionality thus determines the areas of reform and prescribes their 
direction while also defining the means and timeframe within which they have to be implemented. 
Conditionality impacts on domestic governance and transforms the policy making system into a 
compliance and implementation mechanism.  
The paper argues that the reform potential of conditionality relies on its interaction with the domestic 
political system and policy process. A public policy lens can help to better understand the dynamics 
inherent in this process as well as highlight the strengths and limitations of conditionality. Following 
the conventional stages of public policy, the contribution focuses on the political challenges involved 
and sketches out a prospective empirical research agenda. 
Keywords 
Policy conditionality, structural reform, domestic governance, euro crisis management, Policy 
instrument 
 
 1 
Introduction 
Since the emergence of the euro crisis in 2009 and the slow-motion establishment of a crisis 
management apparatus, policy conditionality has permeated every discussion at both the domestic and 
supra-national levels. In essence, policy conditionality is the practice of requiring specific domestic 
policy changes as a condition for financial support (Nelson 1996) or, put otherwise, “the use of 
financial leverage to promote donor objectives” (Killick 1997, 487). It is a prominent instrument that 
has been used for decades by international financial institutions such as the IMF (and the World 
Bank),
1
 making urgently needed financial resources available in return for prescribed policies.
2
 
Policy conditionality is therefore far from new. Although it has been a topical subject since the 
beginning of the euro area crisis, it is also a legacy issue from the decades when it was practised in the 
context of loan programmes for Latin America, Asia and post-communist countries after 1990. The 
track record of conditionality in former programme countries such as Brazil, Indonesia and Russia is at 
best mixed, if not outright disappointing. More importantly, the substance of policy conditionality was 
frequently contested by those on the receiving side. 
More recently, an IMF template has been extensively adopted in the context of the eurozone crisis. 
This template became the default rescue architecture of the IMF, the European Commission and the 
European Central Bank, thereby forming a new institutional arrangement termed the ‘troika’. A double 
novelty is associated with this arrangement. For the first time, policy conditionality was used in the 
context of a decade-old monetary union, which excluded the option of exchange rate adjustments, i.e. 
currency devaluation. Second, the IMF had to collaborate with European institutions, i.e. the European 
Commission and the ECB in euro area programme countries. 
The euro area countries that faced urgent solvency and/or liquidity problems (Greece, Ireland, 
Portugal and Cyprus) received financial assistance packages which linked ‘conditional lending’ to the 
implementation of mandated economic adjustment programmes. These included macroeconomic 
stabilization policies and ‘structural reform’ obligations, involving a broad range of policy areas. The 
policy agenda mirrored the ‘structural adjustment programmes’ promoted and implemented by 
international financial institutions (IFIs) since the 1980s. 
At first sight, policy conditionality refers to the technicalities of loan agreements. Financial 
assistance does not come for free. The beneficiary country needs to make defined policy commitments 
in return for loans which are to be disbursed in tranches, following the progress of implementation, i.e. 
monitoring of compliance with the terms of the loan agreement. However, a closer look adds some 
important details from a policy perspective: policy conditionality is intended to induce policy and 
institutional changes. It determines the areas of reform, it prescribes the direction and the means of 
reform and it defines the time frame within which they have to be implemented. It further involves 
                                                     
1
 The practice of policy conditionality is at the core of the ‘Washington Consensus,’ seen as a ‘transnational policy 
paradigm,’ which helped diffuse it around the world (Babb 2013, 269). “More than a set of economic ideas, a policy 
paradigm is a powerful and enduring framework of related ideas and standards about policy – a model that specifies both 
the instruments that should be used in a policy area and the goals that the policy should be addressing” (Hall 1993, 279). 
On the ‘IMF policy paradigm’ also see David 1985; Lütz 2015. 
2
 Conditionality was used by the EU vis-a-vis accession countries during the eastern enlargements (see Schimmelfennig & 
Sedelmeier 2004). It is still in use in the future Balkan enlargement and tends to expand and become more and more 
demanding (Bieber 2013). It bears, however, a number of differences with respect to the eurozone crisis conditionality, 
which cannot be discussed in this paper. To mention only a few: a context of lender-borrower relations; the extreme 
dependence of programme countries on the provision of financial assistance due to an imminent risk of sovereign default; 
the nature and content of the conditions; the imposed timeframe determined by the volume of resources available and 
committed by the lenders; a higher prominence of moral hazard in the design of conditions; the type of monitoring 
procedures; a stronger perception of sanctions vs. rewards etc. Additionally, as Dreher (2009) notes, the payoff associated 
with an IMF programme is much lower. 
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tight deadlines and often intrusive monitoring procedures under the terms ‘prior actions,’ ‘pending 
actions’ and ‘milestones.’  
Despite decades-long experience with conditionality, the policy dynamics it produces remain a 
long-standing conundrum. While the domestic level is often seen as holding the key to its success, the 
phenomena it is likely to generate have not received proper attention. 
The purpose of this paper is to bring conditionality
3
 back into its natural habitat: the domestic 
policy-making process. The main argument is that the way it works (or not) cannot be understood 
without proper attention to its interaction with the domestic processes it intends to influence. The 
paper therefore takes conditionality as an independent variable
4
 and analyses how this external 
constraint affects various aspects of policy-making from agenda-setting to decision-making and 
implementation. In this endeavour, it offers an overview of critical features and sketches out a 
prospective research agenda. 
The paper focuses on policy conditionality as a policy instrument and on its interaction with the 
domestic political and policy environment. It does not deal directly with the austerity content of 
policies or the ‘Washington consensus’ approach5 to dealing with crisis, and neither with the social 
and economic effects. It considers conditionality as a lever to induce change. In this context, reform 
refers to policy prescriptions under conditionality, although not all of them necessarily constitute 
proper reforms. Some may simply be ad hoc measures or actions. Their appropriateness is an issue to 
be examined on a case-by-case basis and is only indirectly treated here. 
Up to now, the study of policy conditionality has mainly been the domaine réservé of economists 
concerned with international development. With the exception of some political economy approaches 
stressing implementation challenges and the domestic factors affecting them, the reasons for its 
unpredictability and its yielding uncertain results remain obscure, at least on the formal policy scene. 
The ‘added value’ of this paper lies in that it envisages policy conditionality in interaction with the 
domestic policy-making process. This is a theoretical endeavour trying to set a framework and a 
prospective research agenda on policy conditionality which seems to have been ignored by the public 
policy approach. It attempts to move the analysis of the ‘implementation gap’ away from aphorisms 
such as political will and ownership by bridging the public policy and political economy approaches it 
draws upon. Undoubtedly, not all factors can be treated in this paper. In the analysis that follows, 
external actors and factors shaping the more general economic and political constraints reflected in 
conditionality requirements are not examined. 
                                                     
3
 Implicit in many reform proposals is a model that is roughly linear. Thomas & Grindle (1990) highlight that 
implementation is ignored or seen as simply being carrying out what has been decided upon. The critical choice is the 
decision and the rest just follows. 
4
 Although the way it is shaped is also an important issue. See, for example, Stiles 1990; Best 2007; Barnett & Finnemore 
2004. The particular case of eurozone conditionality needs to take into account the respective dynamics of the IMF and 
the EU/EZ. 
5
 The term was first used in 1989 by John Williamson (2008) “referring to the lowest common denominator of policy 
advice being addressed by the Washington-based institutions (IMF, World Bank and US Treasury) to Latin American 
countries as of 1989.” He listed ten corresponding reform areas based on neoclassical economics: fiscal discipline; re-
ordering public expenditure priorities; tax reform; liberalizing interest rates (financial liberalization); a competitive 
exchange rate; trade liberalization; liberalization of inward foreign direct investment; privatization; deregulation; an 
secure property rights. For a discussion of the evolution of the term, see Serra & Stiglitz 2008. The policy paradigm 
remains well and alive with certain adaptations and some refinement of its policy conditionality instruments. See Babb 
2013, 285 ff. Stiglitz (2000, 553) underlines that the term has evolved over time to signify a set of ‘neoliberal’ policy 
prescriptions rather than the more descriptive use (Williamson) originally intended in discussing reforms to be 
undertaken by Latin American economies in the 1980s. “The policies that now fall under the ‘Washington consensus’ 
rubric are often (…) incorrectly- taken to be both necessary and sufficient for substantial development.” Rodrik (2001) 
argues that there now exists an ‘Augmented’ Washington Consensus. Also Lütz 2015. 
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The structure of the paper follows the conventional stages of the policy cycle. A central argument 
is that the very design of conditionality programmes may be responsible for their success or failings. 
After explaining the rationale of policy conditionality with a focus on structural adjustment policies 
(1), the processes that lead from agenda-setting to formal decision-making are examined (2), followed 
by the challenges emerging at the implementation stage (3). This by no means implies adopting a 
linear perspective; on the contrary, the underlying argument is that what may appear as an 
implementation gap is likely to find its roots in the formally ‘preceding’ policy stages. 
1. Policy conditionality: a ‘mega’ policy instrument 
Conditionality can generally be seen as a process of ‘external anchoring’ or ‘external governance,’ as a 
political strategy seeking to provide external incentives for a target government to comply with its 
conditions (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2004). To the extent that it aims to induce a process of 
policy change, it can be seen as an instrument (Lascoumes & Le Galès 2007) which structures the 
policy environment and tries to guide domestic action according to its own logic. While it appears 
technical (i.e. non-political), it constitutes a “powerful mechanism for the control and direction of 
behaviours” (ibid.) by directly and explicitly targeting the incentives of government actors in view of 
prescribed choices. As with any policy instrument, the core underlying issues revolve around its 
legitimacy, its effectiveness and the potential trade-offs between them. 
Domestic policymaking as implementation of conditionality 
Seen from this perspective, policy conditionality is much more than technicalities. It emerges as a 
‘mega’ policy instrument’ which shapes the domestic policy environment in a unique manner, 
affecting its processes and outcomes. It can be considered the constraint par excellence on responsible 
national governments stemming from increased interdependence across national boundaries (Rose 
2014). This constraint goes far beyond anything known in the framework of ‘multi-level policy 
making’ within the EU, because of the sheer weight it poses on domestic political and policy systems 
and the restrictions it involves. More specifically, while policy conditionality needs to be 
‘implemented,’ i.e. complied with, this implementation embraces and substitutes the whole policy-
making process, since most of the policy goals, tools and timing are out of the government’s hands. 
What conditionality describes as implementation is in reality decision-making by national-level 
political actors (e.g. governments, parliaments etc.), as well as domestic implementation. In other 
words, a government subjects its political function to outside decision-makers (international lenders, 
IFIs) who prescribe priorities, ends and means. Conditionality superimposes an additional layer on the 
domestic policy-making configuration. It does not operate merely as (sometimes beneficial) external 
pressure; it instead represents a lever to gain control over the domestic political-administrative and 
policy-making system. As a remote control device, it attempts to guide the domestic policy system, 
circumscribing its breathing space and channelling its course. In sum, policy conditionality tends to 
transform the domestic policy-making system into an implementation and compliance mechanism. In 
this sense, it is a ‘mega’ policy instrument with an aspiration to substitute for a domestic governance 
system. 
Altering the incentive structure 
Policy conditionality rests on the assumption of diverging interests and objectives between private 
lenders and borrowers. Indeed, conditionality has no sense when no heterogeneity (conflict) of 
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interests exists (Drazen 2002, 5; Bird 1998, 93).
6
 It targets the domestic incentive structure in order to 
align the objectives of the ‘agent’ (recipient government) with those of the ‘principal’ (lenders, IFIs) 
(Khan & Sharma 2001, 13). “It influences the behaviour of the governments that receive IFI 
assistance, by encouraging them to pursue a different set of policies than would have otherwise been 
the case or by locking them in to the policies preferred by the IFIs over a specific period of time” (Bird 
1998, 92). 
In other words, conditionality aims at altering the domestic equilibrium of policy preferences by 
shaping a system of sanctions and rewards. For Killick (1997, 487), the essential problem is how 
‘principals’ can design contracts which embody rewards that make it in the interest of ‘agents’ to 
further the principal’s objectives. Based on a certain balance of promises and threats for (non-
)compliance with its requirements, its effectiveness is supposed to depend (among other things) on 
their credibility. 
Obviously, policy conditionality seeks to prevent ‘free-riding’ by the agent at the expense of the 
principal, i.e. primarily ensure the repayment of loans. This is commonly referred to as the risk of 
‘moral hazard’. Drawing on agency theory, it implies a lack of trust in principal-agent relations. 
Borrowing countries need to ‘do their part’ or ‘their homework,’ namely to consent to the 
implementation of specific policies in return for financial assistance. In order to make sure that there is 
not ‘time inconsistency,’ i.e. that policy-makers are ‘locked in,’ that their policy preferences do not 
change over time and that their commitments remain active, loans are disbursed in instalments after 
review of the progress achieved in the implementation of the agreed policy agenda. Thus, 
conditionality implies close monitoring, based on roadmaps, milestones and fixed deadlines. If 
implementation is not deemed satisfactory, the disbursement is suspended. 
It is, nevertheless, not always clear what conditionality primarily represents: a guarantee against 
moral hazard in debtor countries or a reform tool which needs to operate efficiently in country-specific 
circumstances where bounded rationality and political constraints are primarily at work? 
A reform tool? 
Policy conditionality is also presented and legitimated as a reform tool. Prescribed reforms are 
promoted as being in the interest of the country subject to it. In this perspective, its design is supposed 
to provide the appropriate inducements or rewards to orient the behaviour of borrowing countries 
towards specific policy changes. In a more positive light, policy conditionality is meant to tip the 
balance of power in favour of domestic reformers.  
In this sense, conditionality is primarily addressed to governments who sign a loan agreement. The 
underlying assumption is that if the costs and benefits associated with policy change are appropriately 
manipulated (i.e. by increasing the costs of persisting with policies and/or the benefits from prescribed 
reforms) governments will alter their previous preferences. They are seen as utility-maximizing actors 
who respond to the external manipulation of costs and benefits and are therefore expected to ‘deliver.’ 
The rational actor model is obvious in this approach. It assumes the existence of a single actor 
adjusting his preferences and behaviour in view of specific benefits provided (or promised) and in full 
control of the parameters concerning his action. No attention is paid to the socio-political dynamics 
inherent in democratic decision-making and the implementation processes. In sum, the government is 
seen as a single, central, purposefully-acting actor either in full control or cut off from these dynamics. 
                                                     
6
 The official IMF narrative stresses the commonality of objectives between borrowers and creditors. IMF financing and 
recipient country policies are basically presented as two components of a successful programme and lending as 
complementary to policy reform (Drazen 2002, 5). 
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Removing allocative inefficiencies: Structural conditionality 
There are two broad categories of policy change targeted by conditionality: macro-economic 
stabilization and structural adjustment. The first basically involves fiscal adjustment and austerity 
policies, since monetary adjustment (devaluation) is not an option inside a single currency union. The 
second encompasses various microeconomic and institutional reforms to remove allocative 
inefficiencies and it is expected to ensure adequate growth rates. Structural reform is the focus in this 
paper. 
Structural conditionality was gradually developed by the IMF (following the World Bank) as part 
of its various lending facilities. Lack of satisfactory results from macro-economic adjustment in terms 
of growth (Guitián 1995, 32; Polak 1991, 17 and 31) has been a recurrent argument for its continuous 
expansion in new areas since the 1980s. Structural reforms are meant to change patterns of 
misallocation of resources and to transform ‘underlying structural distortions’ in the economy and, 
with them, in state-society relations. They may start from fiscal policy but extend over almost any 
policy sector, since allocative efficiency may be seen as problematic in any policy that has a 
macroeconomic impact.
7
 
Once interest shifted to structural issues, a self-reinforcing process made the number and detail of 
loan conditions explode. “A growing variety of structural reforms, ranging from financial sector 
restructuring to governance issues, came to be seen as potentially relevant for the macroeconomic 
objectives of Fund-supported programs” (IMF 2001a, 12). Indeed, the very notion of structural issues 
involves increased interconnection between a broad range of policy areas and macroeconomic 
variables. 
Structural adjustment measures are more ‘intrusive’ than macro-economic policies (Polak 1991, 
32).
8
 Not only do they involve policy areas not directly related to economic governance but they also 
target the deeper patterns on which state, society and the economy operate. Furthermore, the 
expansion of structural conditionality saw new challenges emerge:  
(a) since quantification is insufficient regarding structural policies, there is a need to devise 
(apparently technical) appropriate monitoring tools, which have a tendency to become more 
politically intrusive (Polak 1991, 32; IMF 2001b, 27); 
(b) the deeper involvement in the domestic issues of debtor countries as a result of structural 
conditionality raises issues of its legitimacy; and 
(c) the common experience of weak compliance and unsatisfying results puts its efficiency to 
test. 
Growing awareness of these problems led the IMF to undertake successive efforts at ‘streamlining,’ 
focusing and reducing structural conditionality – with varying success (see IMF 2001a, 2012a and 
2012b). However, emphasis on structural adjustment in the context of the euro crisis was increased by 
the EU’s focus on selected policy areas (such as market liberalization, privatization etc.). 
Conditionality and policy transfer: coercion and consent 
Normative and coercive elements are both to be found intertwined in policy conditionality. First, they 
refer to the diffusion of intellectually and politically hegemonic policy ideas and a policy paradigm 
                                                     
7
 e.g. health, procurement, pension system, institutional policies (public administration, tax administration, toolkit for the 
business environment), opening of regulated professions, labour market liberalization, product market and service 
liberalisation etc. 
8
 Structural conditionality is more intrusive for domestic political and policy systems. The problems it generates explain 
why the conditionality guidelines have been constantly revised. See Babb 2013; Babb & Garruthers 2008; Lodewijks 
2009; IMF 2001a & 2001b.  
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(Hall 1993; Evans 2009).
9
 The spread of economic liberalization, for instance, as a form of paradigm 
shift takes place – among other things – through conditionality, as practised by international actors 
such as the EU and the IMF (Simmons & al. 2008, 10-11).
10
 Indeed, policy conditionality can be seen 
as a form of policy transfer
11
 or policy diffusion.
12
 These processes may range along a continuum 
which runs from voluntary (learning/lesson drawing) to coercive (direct imposition). Conditionality is 
a form of ‘negotiated policy transfer’13 and comes closer to direct imposition (Evans 2009, 245; 
Dolowitz & Marsh 2000, 13; Simmons et al. 2008, ibid.). 
Coercive elements obviously derive from the asymmetry of power between lender and borrower.
14
 
However, conditionality in the context of lender-borrower relations appears in the form of an 
‘agreement,’ which may be described as a coercion/consent process (Barnett & Finnemore 2004, 47-
48 & 165). Coercion includes the material resources that allow the economic costs and benefits for a 
borrower country to be manipulated, but also the control of information and expertise that especially 
IFIs dispose of and that further allows them to orient action towards specific policies (Barnett & 
Finnemore 2004, 6-7).
15
  
The content of policy conditionality is presented as an expert assessment, as the ‘one best way’ out 
of a country’s problems that is difficult to counter-argue. Prescribed policies are a reflection of the 
claim to a monopoly on expertise and the ‘paternalism’ characterizing IFIs (Barnett & Finnemore 
2004), whose role in global policy diffusion is well established. This inherent claim of rationality 
contrasts with the ‘bounded rationality’ (Simon 1976) and the political nature of policy constraints 
(Lindblom 1959; Wildavsky 1987). 
                                                     
9
 Stiles (1990, 972) underlines, for instance, “the significance of IMF ideology in shaping the adjustment policies of 
nations even when IMF staff are not directly involved in the national policy process.” 
10
 While structural adjustment is obviously a multifaceted process, present practice emphasizes the role of liberalization, or 
what is often called ‘market oriented reform’ (Rodrik 1990, 933). 
11
 Policy transfer is “the process in which knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in 
one political setting (past or present) is used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and 
ideas in another political setting” (Dolowitz & Marsh 2000, 5). 
12
 Simmons et al. (2008, 2 & 7)’s assumption is that national policy choices are at least to some extent interdependent. 
“International policy diffusion occurs when government policy decisions in a given country are systematically 
conditioned by prior policy choices made in other countries (sometimes mediated by the behaviour of international 
organizations or private actors and organizations).” 
13
 Evans (2009, 245) refers to ‘negotiated policy transfer’ specifically in the case of the structural adjustment programmes 
of the IMF and the World Bank. He describes it as “a process in which governments are compelled by, for example, 
influential donor countries, global financial institutions, supra-national institutions, international organizations or 
transnational corporations, to introduce policy change in order to secure grants, loans or other forms of inward 
investment. Although an exchange process does occur, it remains a coercive activity because the recipient country is 
denied freedom of choice.” 
14
 As Babb notes (2013, 278), the diffusion of the Washington consensus was uneven: it influenced government policies in 
countries that were desperate to get access to IFI resources. Simmons et al. (2008) observe that the diffusion of 
liberalization takes advantage of the temporary vulnerability of a country. Carlos Diaz Alessandro (1984 in Khan & 
Sharma 2001) describes conditionality as follows: “If you ask for a gift, you must listen to your patron.” The IMF totally 
defends itself against such a perspective. Efforts at developing an alternative vision as part of IMF intellectual production 
include Khan & Sharma (2001, 3) who set out to “dispel the widespread notion that conditionality stems from a ‘patron-
beneficiary’ relationship between the IMF and the borrowing country.” 
15
 Their power consists in a) material coercion (or inducements), such as the resources that they lend to states in need which 
lead governments to adopt prescribed policies they would not otherwise adopt; b) manipulating information i.e. by 
collecting, publicizing and strategically deploying information, creating transparency and monitoring compliance, thus 
changing the incentives for state action; and more fundamentally c) using their authority to orient action and create social 
reality, i.e. analysing information in a way that orients and prompts action, by taking raw data and coupling them to 
particular policy problems (e.g. definition of development, sound policies etc.) transforming information to knowledge 
(Barnett & Finnemore 2004, 6-7). 
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Consent refers to the effort to convince borrowing states that these policies are objectively 
warranted, reinforced by the possibility of educating national officials in borrower countries about 
macroeconomic policy-making. However, the asymmetry of power and an urgent need for funding are 
strong enough arguments to make convincing easy.
16
  
Does conditionality determine success? 
However, policy conditionality is no guarantee of effectiveness.
17
 Its failings, its uncertain or 
disappointing results (including in terms of growth) have been debated extensively, mainly from an 
economic point of view, and have motivated an infinite number of studies and publications.
18
 Various 
remedies have been proposed, either in the framework of the institutions practising conditionality 
(IMF, World Bank) or in the wider academic debate on international development issues. They range 
from more and tighter conditions and stringent monitoring procedures to the replacement of ex-post 
with ex-ante conditionality, to restriction of lending to only those countries with a good reform record, 
or even plainly to its abolition. 
In these debates it is common “to call for greater efforts to strengthen institutional capacity or to 
blame failure on lack of political will, an explanation often propounded by external analysts and 
donors who see countries not carrying out reforms they consider desirable” (Thomas & Grindle 1990, 
1164). But, as Bird (1998) asks, is it simply a matter of political will? All the more since there is 
evidence that the degree of compliance is a decreasing function of programme severity.
19
 “The 
circumstances in which the programme is most likely to be implemented” need to be given some 
thought.
20
 
The policy-making chain from decision-making to implementation involves numerous actors 
within and outside government, who may be more or less exposed to the above-described 
coercion/consent process of adopting conditionality prescriptions. They may hold different views and 
pursue various interests, be they ‘universalistic’ or ‘particularistic.’ The question remains of how the 
process of coercion/consent underlying conditionality will go beyond the central actors involved in the 
negotiations and the agreement (typically, core economic ministries led by the ministry of finance) to 
encompass the rest of government, social partners, professional groups and society in general. 
                                                     
16
 Buira (2003, 5) states that “within broad limits, conditionality is a relation of power… it can be said to be coercive when 
the cost of not accepting conditionality is so much higher that it has no choice than to accept conditions making the 
country do things it would not do otherwise, particularly as countries have a strong preference for avoiding the costs of 
default”. “At its best, conditionality is a form of paternalism, by which the country is guided towards its own good.” 
17
 Effectiveness itself needs to be explained: output or outcome is the first question. Does it concern the full and faithful 
implementation of the agenda or bringing about the promised growth? And who are the priority beneficiaries – the global 
economy, the country’s economy or its society and which groups? What is its time horizon, given the short-term 
concentrated social costs and the non-specified future benefits? These pressing questions highlight the need to strike a 
balance directly linked to the legitimacy of present decisions and policies. See, for example, Bird 1998; Nelson 1996. 
Furthermore, the distinction between first, second and third order change (Hall 1993; Evans 2009) may also be useful to 
identify the depth of changes intended. 
18
 See, for example, Killick 1997; Dreher 2009; Bird 1998, 2001, 2009; Feldstein 1998 etc., and the series of IMF reviews 
of conditionality. Most of them are concerned with the determinants of compliance.  
19
 Bird (2003) explores the question “Is there a conditionality Laffer curve?” 
20
 “If the ultimate objective of policy conditionality is to improve the economic performance of countries to which it is 
applied, then it is insufficient to design a program which is appropriate in merely economic terms.” (Bird, 1998, 91). 
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Still struggling with the issue,
21
 in defence of policy conditionality new ideas and explanations 
were brought in by institutions that practise it. One is the concept of ‘reform ownership,’ which more 
recently partly replaced ‘political will’ as a factor explaining or defining the conditions for its success. 
In sum, conditionality is a controversial policy instrument, both from the point of view of 
effectiveness and from that of legitimacy. Despite being presented as a set of technical and 
technocratic issues, policy conditionality appears as a political device par excellence. Not only does it 
promote  
(a) a specific normative content, but 
(b) it also takes advantage of asymmetrical relationships 
(c) to alter domestic governance processes.  
Despite being presented as self-evident when compared with the private relations between lenders and 
borrowers, it generates more controversy because the borrower is a sovereign country,
22
 especially 
when it touches on sensitive policy issues and therefore becomes politically intrusive. 
The most visible signs of the multiple rationality underlying policy conditionality are focusing on 
the incentive structure while dealing with moral hazard. Incompatibilities and internal contradictions 
are not excluded. On the contrary, they need to be highlighted by research dealing with the implied 
reform potential and efficacy. What appears as a central issue is a lack of understanding or recognition 
of the processes that shape the preferences of policy-makers. The ‘functionalist’ approach of 
prescribed policies, which emphasizes their necessity, urgency and the prospective benefits, appears to 
oversimplify. It also avoids any uneasy discussion of the short- and medium-term social costs, and 
even more fundamentally of the design and the authoritative definition of the problems and solutions it 
includes, which are kept immune to competing views. 
2. From agenda-setting to decision-making 
We now turn to an overview of the policy cycle. What does conditionality mean for the agenda-setting 
and decision-making processes? How does it affect policy-makers’ breathing space and action? 
Agenda-setting and issue definition. An exclusive process? 
The process of agenda-building usually involves different groups inside the government or in society 
promoting issues of interest to them. It includes political conflicts over issue definition and adoption, 
and as a result has a filtering effect, by which certain issues are allowed access to or excluded from the 
agenda (Cobb, Ross & Ross 1976). 
Obligations and requirements of conditionality imposed by (external) lenders
23
 represent a special 
kind of ‘demand stress’ (Easton 1965) on the domestic political system, since they (are meant to) take 
precedence over domestic needs and demands. In fact, conditionality forces pre-selected issues onto 
the formal governmental agenda.
24
 It operates as a parallel agenda-setting process, bypassing the 
                                                     
21
 Structural conditionality is a perennial issue for the IMF, as evidenced by the successive efforts to ‘streamline’ 
conditionality guidelines and the inconclusive discussion regarding its merits and drawbacks. See IEO/IMF 2007; IMF 
2001a, 2001b and 2012a. 
22
 “Conditional loans to nation states necessarily involve messy questions of national sovereignty and internal politics” 
(Babb & Garruthers 2008). 
23
 Whose role Nelson (1996, 1557) qualifies as ‘invasive’. 
24
 Cobb, Ross & Ross (1976, 126) distinguish two types of agendas: the public agenda, consisting of issues 
which have achieved a high level of public interest and visibility; and the formal agenda, including the list of 
items which decision-makers have formally accepted for serious consideration. Kindgon (2003, 3-4) 
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normal channels and establishing a priority access path. It also operates as an additional filter, 
restricting the access of groups and the issues they promote to the government’s agenda if they are not 
compatible with its stated priorities. In other words, conditionality gains control over the agenda-
setting process. 
Prescribed reforms frame problems and define priorities and remedies, excluding or preventing 
alternatives from emerging. “There are great political stakes in problem definition,” underlines 
Kindgon. Some are hurt and others are helped, depending on how problems get defined. Problem 
definition includes values, comparisons and categories which structure the perception of problems. In 
particular, categorization is a typical arena for the struggle over problem definition (2003, 110-111). 
The freedom of the government and outside groups to promote a different definition and 
prioritization and to specify alternatives is consequently restricted. Given that conditionality-related 
issues are additionally accompanied by monitoring and follow-up mechanisms with a view to 
increasing (if not guaranteeing) the chances of their further progress (i.e. implementation), they 
become absolute priorities, overshadowing or side-lining competing claims. 
Crisis as opportunity and garbage can model 
But how is crisis linked to reform? Crises are ‘focusing events’ that can affect problem definition. 
“They may create a sense that something is amiss and should be re-examined,” explains Kingdon 
(2003, 94 ff). They may trigger a learning process that allows a reconsidering or reassessment of past 
certainties and which facilitates policy transfer. They generally create a sense of urgency and room for 
‘special politics’ for a finite period of time. 
However, this needs a certain level of ‘agency’ or ‘policy entrepreneurship,’ that is, it does not 
come automatically. The opportunity provided by the change in the policy environment, i.e. the 
‘policy window’ (Kingdon 2003, 166-167), has to be exploited/put to use by domestic policy-makers 
wishing to pursue reforms of their choice. While a series of requirements are linked to the conditional 
lending, other policy objectives may also find an opening to be put into effect. Reformers may then 
“package immediately needed or required reforms with reforms desired in the longer run” (i.e. 
macroeconomic with microeconomic reforms) (Tommasi & Velasco 1996, 199). 
The content of policy conditionality is formally shaped after negotiation with the representatives of 
creditors (IMF, troika). It takes the form of contracts (agreements) as expressed in ‘Letters of Intent’ 
and ‘Memoranda of Understanding’ (MoU). The urgency of the financial situation which brings states 
to the creditors’ doorstep does not allow a real margin for manoeuvre. In order to avert outright 
disaster, governments tend to reluctantly accept prescribed policies, since by definition they have no 
funding alternatives. In reality, this may cover a number of alternative situations, regarding who has 
drafted the programme, what the involvement of the country was, what the government included on its 
own, and what was required, as well as the probability of the programme attaining its objectives. 
Sometimes, besides ‘core conditionality’ issues, i.e. ones directly linked to the access to funding, 
loan agreements may comprise policies that a government has decided to include in the conditionality 
requirements (‘pro forma’ conditionality, according to Killick 1997, 487).25 The share of each is 
difficult to assess and a particularly interesting matter for empirical research. This is likely to be the 
rationale of reformist governments, who may hold a generally positive perception of the reform 
potential of policy conditionality. For them, it may open a ‘policy window’ of which they take 
(Contd.)                                                                  
distinguishes the governmental agenda (list of subjects or problems getting attention) from the decision 
agenda (those that are up for an active decision). 
25
 “Hard core conditionality can be defined as policy changes stipulated as a prerequisite to the approval of, or continued 
access to, a grant or loan, or to subsequent assistance.” ‘Pro forma’ conditionality: “mutually agreed, or non-significant, 
or formalistic provisions which both parties find it convenient to write into a program.” (Killick 1997, 487). 
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advantage to promote decisions as part of an emergency agenda to strengthen the chances of 
implementation (‘crisis-as-opportunity’). The opportunity may also be that they resort to scapegoating 
the lenders’ representatives for difficult reforms the necessity of which they share.26 They can also try 
to ‘appropriate’ a mixed reform agenda in this way.27 In any case, the ‘pro forma’ conditionality issues 
will have to pass a ‘compatibility test’ with regard to core conditionality, while their inclusion in the 
agenda will ensure (a) that they are subject to a higher-level national priority, i.e. continuing funding 
and (b) the obligation to respect the same deadlines and monitoring procedures. 
It is sometimes argued that the critical financial situation in which a country finds itself when its 
economic survival depends on conditional lending suspends – or tolerates the suspension of – the 
normal agenda-setting processes (i.e. the political processes). In other words, the criticality of the 
situation (l’état d’urgence) is a substitute policy framework that renders any further debate – including 
opposition – redundant. This substitution is in part implicit in the ‘new conventional wisdom on 
reform’ (Tommasi & Velasco 1996, 197), i.e. the assumption that a crisis is an opportunity, a ‘critical 
juncture’ when it is possible to do almost everything that has not been accomplished or even remotely 
envisaged in the past. 
A ‘crisis-as-opportunity’ approach may also be an invitation to promote various objectives dressed 
up as solutions to the problems. This describes a ‘garbage can’ case,28 i.e. an opportunity to promote 
selected policies and priorities even beyond the needs of crisis management. Advocates of solutions 
look for current problems to which to attach their preferred solution, notes Kingdon (2003, 123 and 
87-88). This is the ‘garbage can model,’ in which ‘multiple streams’ (of problems, policies and 
politics) which operate largely independently of one another are coupled at critical junctures 
producing (or explaining) significant agenda changes. 
However, certain questions unavoidably emerge regarding who promotes which policy and in view 
of which objective. As much as domestic policy-making, policy conditionality combines technical 
issues with political choices. Who is the author of these policies and based on which criteria? How far 
should conditionality go into the domestic issues? The fact that its requirements tend to become 
expansive and intrusive is a recurrent issue in the corresponding debates.  
This is why on many occasions and following different formulations there are calls for parsimony, 
with fewer, focused and more flexible conditions. The need to increase or strengthen domestic policy 
entrepreneurship or ‘ownership’ is intricately linked to these debates. Even if the argument is that the 
problems are deep and numerous, how realistic are the chances to solve them from the outside? 
Perceptions that they are imposed by external non-domestic actors often result in tensions that not only 
                                                     
26
 IMF 2001b, 20-21. The IMF acknowledges cases where domestic authorities “wish to use Fund conditionality to 
crystallize their own reform program and possibly to send a signal to markets or various domestic constituencies. This 
would explain the extensive or detailed conditionality. In these cases, the government may wish to use a Fund-supported 
program to lock in certain reforms and help resolve domestic policy disagreements. The Fund at times has agreed to play 
this role to help reform-minded elements in the government to accomplish change – perhaps supporting those taking the 
opportunity of acute financing needs to accomplish long-needed reforms. This approach has some drawbacks, however: 
even when it essentially helps the authorities (or some elements among them) to accomplish reforms, it may be seen as 
short-circuiting legitimate domestic political processes. Moreover, allowing the Fund to be cast as an unyielding external 
partner may generate resistance to policy implementation and, in the longer run, undermine the overall effectiveness of 
the institution. Finally, as noted above, a longer list of conditions raises the likelihood of slippages, and may distract 
attention from what is really crucial.” 
27
 Killick underlines that “the pro forma elements may be important: in supporting the position of reformers within 
government; in defining and timetabling actions with a precision they would not otherwise have; and in making 
agreements acceptable to each negotiating team’s superior authorities.” (Killick 1997, 487). 
28
 “A major feature of the garbage can process is the partial uncoupling of problems and choices. ... Problems are worked 
upon in the context of some choice, but choices are made only when the shifting combinations of problems, solutions and 
decision-makers happen to make the action possible” (Cohen, March & Olsen 1988, 323). 
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the representatives of the lenders face but also governments who pursue them, undermining their 
legitimacy and implementation capacity. 
Mobilization of support 
Governments are no less monolithic than societies. The political processes developing around policy 
conditionality coexist with wider socio-political claims that compete for influence on the 
government’s agenda. In a crisis situation the costs of delay become enormous and key players move 
to a ‘closed rule’ (ibid. Tommasi & Velasco 1996, 199). In this process it is the ministry of finance 
that mainly sees its power and influence reasserted. As loan conditions are typically negotiated under 
time and economic pressure by a small group inside the government around the minister of finance, 
the various sectoral ministers and other actors hardly have any say in the process. They are instead 
invited to share and serve these priorities. 
While lenders and their representatives dominate agenda-setting, the room for counter-proposals is 
restrained. The possibility of ‘issue expansion,’ i.e. a redefinition that allows its adoption by wider 
groups inside and outside the government, is greatly limited. The weight of the initial definition of 
policies and remedies in the loan agreement tied to funding considerably restricts their policy 
initiatives. Hence, divergence within government and even more with outside actors is likely to persist 
and manifest itself at a later stage. 
In contrast to the ‘outside initiative model’ (Cobb, Ross and Ross 1976),29 issues falling under 
policy conditionality access the governmental agenda without having first been debated or having 
obtained support in society. Policy goals are defined under external influence (or even pressure) 
without having received backing even within the political-administrative apparatus. Given the scope 
and depth of reforms prescribed, which greatly affect the wider population as much as organized 
interest groups, expanding the issue to the population and generating mobilization of support or at 
least tolerance for the policy changes would be essential to their legitimacy and success.  
How much is this part of a policy conditionality agenda? Three claims may be made in this regard.  
(a) Mobilization is not deemed necessary or desirable because the government as the central 
decision-maker can ensure their adoption.  
(b) The lack of involvement of society is a favourable condition, to avoid public reaction. 
(c) Creating support mobilization is the duty of the domestic government. 
The first two claims mean that a strong central government can take the necessary decisions without 
having to open up the process to social actors, or even that it is better to avoid this. This relies on a 
twin assumption: it sees the government (a) as a single powerful actor and (b) as cut off from or else 
fully in control of the political system and society’s potential reaction. Undoubtedly, this scenario 
would be the simplest and most effective for the external actors imposing policy conditionality, were it 
                                                     
29
 Cobb, Ross & Ross distinguish three different models of agenda-building depending on variation in the four major stages 
of issue careers: initiation, specification, expansion, and entrance. The first, the outside initiative model, accounts for the 
process through which issues arise in nongovernmental groups and are then expanded sufficiently to reach first the public 
agenda and finally the formal agenda. The second, the mobilization model, considers issues which are initiated inside 
government and consequently achieve formal agenda status almost automatically. Successful implementation of these 
issues often requires, however, that they be placed on a public agenda as well. The mobilization model accounts for the 
ways decision makers attempt to implement a policy by expanding an issue from the formal to the public agenda. The 
third, the inside initiative model, describes issues which arise within the governmental sphere and whose supporters do 
not try to expand them to the mass public. Instead these supporters base their hopes of success on their own ability to 
apply sufficient pressure to assure formal agenda status, a favourable decision and successful implementation. In this 
model, initiating groups often specifically wish to prevent an issue from expanding to the mass public; they do not want it 
on the public agenda (Cobb, Ross & Ross 1976, 127-128). 
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reconcilable with democracy. This is why one strand of criticism of conditionality hints at its implicit 
preference for strong executives (and for some, for authoritarian regimes). 
The idea of ‘reform ownership’ corresponds to the claim that the government is responsible for 
generating domestic support. However, this depends on the political and policy space available to 
redefine the issues and the preferred solutions. As argued above, the government’s choices are limited 
(a) in terms of substance and (b) in terms of time (see below). In other words, even if mobilization in 
support of the prescribed agenda is an objective, the way policy conditionality requirements are 
formed is likely to restrict the probability of such an enterprise. 
How much can the representatives of the lenders do in this direction? To what extent could they 
contribute by communicating information and by involving opposition parties, social partners or other 
actors in the discussion? And to what extent may this help the process of adopting the policy-
conditionality priorities? There is certainly a lot of room for empirical research. It seems, however, 
that although it might be beneficial there are limits to such an action coming from external ‘third 
parties.’ 
To the extent that agenda-setting under policy conditionality significantly restricts the possibility 
for society and various groups to see their concerns, reactions and aspirations taken into account in the 
policymaking process, a likely result is strategies of conflict expansion “which are crucial to outside 
groups seeking to place their issue on the formal agenda” (Cobb, Ross and Ross 1976, 130).  
By creating a restrictive and constraining filter between the political system and society, policy 
conditionality is likely to undermine both the legitimacy of policies and the political capital of the 
government that implements them. It superimposes an additional layer of ‘gatekeepers’ that reduce the 
government’s capacity to be responsive and thus stimulate (either diffuse or specific) support when 
producing its authoritative outputs that allocate values and resources. 
Decision process: a mere formality? 
Once the issues under policy conditionality are on the government’s agenda, the formal decision-
making process is initiated. Given that most of these polices substantially alter social and economic 
relations and rights, they normally need to be approved by the parliament. This changes the arena of 
politics. Up to this stage, policy requirements tend to be kept in the narrow confines of government 
and the bureaucracy. Now comes the moment when the parliamentary debate opens the process to 
political parties, and also to society and interest groups. This is the last chance for the government to 
hold an inclusive debate, convince and shape alliances, and generate support. How does the process 
unfold? How are policy decisions announced, debated and institutionally sanctioned? Does the 
practice of closed circles that dominated agenda-setting continue? 
Divergence of opinion and interest-based (re-)action are elements inherent in the policy process 
that need to be taken into account and accommodated. Pluralistic democracies rest on the premise of 
involvement, participation, persuasion and similar processes that relate decision-making power to its 
social environment. The institutional technology for deliberation, consultation and debate includes 
most visibly the parliament, but also social dialogue institutions and participation bodies etc. Their 
importance rests in their potential for building alliances and shaping compromise among 
‘stakeholders.’30 They define the procedural legitimacy that is a minimum requirement for democratic 
decision-making. 
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 Boughton & Mourmouras (2002, 7-8) underline that “in order for conditionality to be effective, it must be consistent with 
the recipient country’s domestic political economy equilibrium, which is determined by the strategic interactions between 
the government and various collective or individual stakeholders in the public sector whose consent is needed for reforms 
to be implemented.” The support of key actors outside the government is important. 
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Actors until then directly or indirectly excluded from the process tend to position themselves vis-à-
vis the government’s policy initiatives. The optimum usually sought is that all parties or the majority 
of them support the policies. This is where the nature of the political system and the degree of 
consensus between and within parties increases in importance. Political systems in the euro area range 
from more consensual to adversarial. Their features are known in advance and the likely positions and 
reactions of parties can broadly be anticipated. If legitimacy and consensus for the policies on the 
decision-making agenda have not been built during the agenda-setting process, it is likely that dissents 
will appear exacerbated in the public eye and polarization will increase. Most of the pressure involved 
in these processes is likely to fall on the shoulders of the government majority.
31
 
Procedures, as much as deliberation and democracy, need time. Given that disagreement and 
opposition are more or less to be expected, it is important to allow room for arguments to be 
exchanged and compromises to be reached. Sometimes, ‘buying time’ helps shape more favourable 
conditions. Temporarily removing an item from the agenda and postponing a decision may better 
prepare the field; ‘slicing’ is also a method for advancing in an incremental way. This option is clearly 
inexistent under policy conditionality. The government is thus deprived of a sufficient margin to shape 
a reform strategy. 
Operating under policy conditionality results in the reassertion of the executive vis-à-vis the 
legislature. Given the imperative timetable for the implementation of the reform agenda, governments 
under time constraints are likely to try and minimize procedural requirements. This may range from 
not submitting a loan agreement to the parliament at all to resorting to ‘emergency’ procedures and 
abridged deadlines for parliamentary discussion of important pieces of legislation and ‘omnibus bills’ 
dealing with many diverse issues. Governments may even need to use executive orders to respect the 
deadlines and minimize reaction within their ranks, as well as from other parties. 
Hence, to varying degrees, normal institutionalized decision-making procedures are bypassed either 
formally or in substance. Not only is there not sufficient debate on important issues but transparency 
and quality of legislation issues arise. 
In such a context, society tends to become a mere spectator. Reference to ‘ownership’ often implies 
that beyond governments support by other actors is also important. But these actors are excluded by 
the way policies are defined and promoted. While the successive revisions of IMF conditionality 
guidelines systematically stress the need for outreach, it is not necessarily a priority. Outreach has to 
do with space for developing arguments and for persuading that the ends and means prescribed by 
conditionality policies are appropriate. The social costs involved are an important but not the only 
contentious aspect of programme implementation. However, the conditions for substantial policy 
discussion are limited in terms of time and space in the agenda-setting process as much as in the 
Parliamentary arena. 
* 
Policy conditionality not only promotes one of the possible ways of framing (or defining) the policy 
problem to tackle and prescribes the way it should be acted upon (ends/means) but also defines the 
time frame for taking action. These factors in combination greatly reduce the government’s and the 
parliament’s margin for manoeuvre. Their policy space almost vanishes. 
They need to ‘deliver’, i.e. to promote generally unpopular policies, without being in a position to 
choose either the policy tools or the timing. In a nutshell, by design the way the domestic policy 
process unfolds under policy conditionality hardly takes into account the importance of process, time 
and the conditions for successful reform implementation. Above all, it threatens the reservoir of 
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 In this regard, it would be interesting to examine the dynamics of governmental change before, during and after the 
completion of an adjustment programme. 
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support for the government and for the reforms themselves. All this is likely to be tested in the 
implementation stage. 
3. Implementation: confronting realities on the ground 
There is a long-standing debate concerning the capacity of governments to achieve the desired policy 
objectives and the common experience of ‘implementation gaps’ (Bardach 1977, Pressman & 
Wildavsky 1973; Sabatier & Mazmanian 1981). The question has been raised independently of 
whether governments follow their own reform programme or have to implement an agenda supported 
by external anchors (donors, lenders, technical assistance programmes etc.).  
This has, however, been an issue of particular concern regarding structural adjustment reforms 
undertaken under policy conditionality requirements. The poor and disappointing results observed for 
decades contradict the effectiveness promised by this policy instrument and those who promote it as a 
lever for reform.
32
 The issue is even more important because of its unintended side-effects and the 
tension it maintains with legitimacy grounded in other important values, such as democracy and 
accountability. 
Top down rational accounts of implementation assume full control over the corresponding process 
and their arguments are mostly based on the technocratic merits of the initial plan. The complexities of 
the process, however, make ‘perfect implementation unattainable’ (Hogwood & Gunn 1984, 198). 
Contrary to assumptions and prescriptions, conditionality forces selected issues onto the agenda, 
constrains decision-making, but does very little in assisting policy implementation. Still, 
implementation (described as the process of putting decisions into effect) is the most crucial part of 
policy-making. It involves interaction between state and society, a process that includes constant 
redefining of problems and solutions as well as new decisions, often at the executive and bureaucratic 
level. But it also provides a new arena where support and opposition as well as unintended 
consequences are likely to emerge, which need to be accommodated by new policy responses. In this 
sense, ‘policies have lives of their own, independent of human volition’ (Wildavsky 1987, 3). 
Specificities of structural policies 
Implementation issues cannot be understood without reference to the specific features of policy areas 
and problems. One of the issues that merit attention is the type and characteristics of the individual 
policy. Policy determines politics, as highlighted long ago by Lowi (1972), i.e. the type of conflicts 
potentially generated by a policy, the arena of power where they manifest themselves, the distribution 
of costs and benefits, and the corresponding potential for mobilization in favour or against it.  
In principle, the benefits of structural policies are widely distributed while the costs concentrate on 
particular groups. Adding the temporal dimension, i.e. that the benefits are to be seen in the distant 
future, such policies are likely to face resistance if they do not have strong support (Wilson 1980; 
Olson 1971). These aspects determine the challenges a government is confronted with, which may be 
more or less within its reach. Not all policies can be handled in the same way, hence the importance of 
appropriate strategies. 
In this regard, the distinction between economic and structural conditionality makes a significant 
difference. Policies linked to economic stabilization and fiscal consolidation are centrally decided and 
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 Based on a literature review, Geer (2014, 60 ff.) summarizes the problems of structural adjustment policies as follows: 
severe implementation problems, at best mediocre for growth, bad for equality, health and social cohesion, not 
destabilizing entrenched elites, having unintended consequences. He concludes ‘The procedural legitimacy of the 
conditional loan as a policy instrument had always been weak and its outcome legitimacy – the extent to which it works 
justifies it - turned out to be weak as well’ (ibid. 66). 
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implemented, involving a small set of central economic actors around the ministry of finance – and 
IFIs – with little, if any, debate and minimal dependence on other societal actors. They comprise 
changing macro rules and reducing the size and scope of the state through drastic budget cuts, tax 
reforms, deregulation and generally decisions which have an immediate impact. 
In contrast, structural policies and institutional reforms have a medium- and long-term horizon and, 
frequently, lower public visibility. They encompass a broad range of reforms, such as boosting 
competitiveness and exports by product-market and labour-market reforms, increasing the capacity of 
the administration, the regulatory institutions and the judiciary, reforming health, education and other 
sectors of social services. Deep ‘structural’ changes engage a broader set of government actors, but 
also involve a wide array of social, economic and professional groups, the bureaucracy, the media, 
social partners, the private sector, political parties etc. They can hardly be carried out without lengthy 
discussion and participation, the technical expertise of the affected parties and the building of 
legislative and interest-group bases of support (Tommasi & Velasco 1996, 227. Nelson 1994 and 
1996).  
Because of this wide involvement, implementation can be qualified as ‘decentralized.’ The 
leverage that the ministry of finance has to set rules and enforce them based on its central 
implementation capacity
33
 is not matched by line ministries. Even if decisions are centrally made, they 
are exposed to inter-organizational and social dynamics much more, and necessitate the commitment 
of more agencies and social actors. They may remain empty shells as long as they do not manage to 
gain the cooperation, acceptance or (even unwilling) consent of social, economic and professional 
groups at the receiving end. 
Therefore, these two types of policy conditionality point to different reform processes. In an open 
political system, structural reforms (such as labour market liberalization) require a wider inclusive 
approach. As mentioned above, structural policies by definition aim to change the underlying 
structures of operation of the economy, the society and the state. They affect a large number of actors 
and interests and their interaction. They inevitably deal with past policies and their effects as well as 
with social behaviours, culture and traditions. 
While they reallocate costs and benefits, often in a radical way, they depend on the response of the 
societal actors involved. The change in the rules of the game does not automatically bring the intended 
results and time is needed for behaviour to be re-modelled.
34
 Their implementation is complex and 
difficult at any time, and even more under the pressure of conditionality requirements. They are likely 
to be achieved gradually, in ‘better times,’ when there is some ‘fiscal space,’ rather than under 
austerity conditions.
35
 There is no need to stress that they test the capacity and endurance of any 
government that undertakes such reforms. 
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 See, for example, fiscal reforms, financial management reforms and some administrative and local government reforms. 
These are qualified as ‘self-implementing policies,’ i.e. ones that do not require depth and continuity of administrative 
resources (Thomas & Grindle 1990, 1171). Of course, there might be an issue of sustainability. Nelson (1996, 1556) 
concludes that reformist politicians and external (donor) agencies seeking to support and encourage reform must 
reconsider their strategies and techniques. 
34
 Brawley & Baerg (2007) highlight the micro-level processes underlying adjustment which are not taken into account by 
the ‘unrealistic assumptions’ of the economic models behind structural adjustment programmes. “These micro-level 
dynamics shape the domestic politics of structural adjustment. Political opposition often has made structural adjustment 
programmes unsustainable. Structural adjustment programs have failed to appreciate the uncertainties and risks inherent 
in the adjustment process. These risks have shaped the behaviour of domestic actors – adjustment failed whenever 
workers would not jump from one sector to another or when farmers would not change the types of goods they produced. 
Risks have also influenced the politics adjustment generated. The typical models we use in political economy often 
assume away the risks, thereby yielding unrealistic portraits of domestic actors’ preferences” (ibid. 601). 
35
 The broad components of reform stabilization, liberalization, institutional and structural reforms and public sector reform 
“operate on different timetables and pose different challenges” (Nelson 1996, 1554). Beyond stabilization, other reforms 
may be slower and more complex and extend over many years. 
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A counter-argument might be that these policies have not been undertaken in the past and therefore 
the pressure of conditionality may act as a reform enhancer. It is important, however, to distinguish 
between the pressure conditionality exerts on government and the room the latter needs in order to 
successfully promote reforms and deal with the consequences they have on society. 
Reform strategies: time, sequence, sustainability 
The provision of financial assistance in exchange for conditional policies is supposed to create a 
favourable environment, in the sense of giving time to the country to introduce these adjustments. 
Time as a policy resource is certainly important, but when the time necessary for reforms is 
determined by the financial resources committed it may not represent what is actually needed. Time 
pressure can be taken for granted under policy conditionality. 
Given the unavoidable frictions they provoke and their social costs, the rhythm of structural 
reforms (i.e. the speed and sequencing) raises important issues: should they be implemented fully and 
immediately or gradually? Should they be undertaken simultaneously or in a sequence? High reform 
ambitions, such as in a ‘big-bang’ or ‘shock therapy’ approach, describe ‘full speed on all fronts’ as 
the only strategy available to reformers. Although others make the case for gradualism and argue that 
a big bang strategy involves unbearably high transitional costs and hence weakens political support for 
reform,
36
 the big bang approach often dominates (Tommasi and Velasco 1996; Stiglitz 2000; Rodrik 
2016). The crisis-as-opportunity argument is often reinforced by the restricted character of financial 
assistance, and therefore of the limited time available. 
Thus, an overcrowded reform agenda is a frequent feature of conditionality.
37
 But the scope and the 
depth of reforms matter for implementation. Typically, structural conditionality has steadily increased 
despite efforts to streamline and focus it on priority issues. While this expansion has often been 
justified by the ‘synergy effect’ created, in practice it requires a volume of resources that often may 
not be available in the domestic political system. 
On the contrary, a dispersion of efforts and resources on too many fronts may prove 
counterproductive. When a reform does not stand alone but is one of a series of unpopular actions, “it 
might become the straw that breaks the camel’s back. If so, the question of timing becomes important 
to allow the government to assess and replenish its political support bases” (Thomas & Grindle 1990, 
1175). The conventional wisdom that ‘there are never good times for hard decisions’ overlooks the 
fact that there are better or worse moments. 
The pace and sequence of reform is further crucial for its success and sustainability (Stiglitz 2000). 
Quick wins may not pay adequate attention to the systemic nature of the reform process and the need 
for complementary reforms. Rodrik (1990) considers sustainability
38
 more important than the content 
of reforms (e.g. liberalization). He distinguishes between two reform dimensions: range and 
magnitude. The first relates to the narrow or wide range of areas covered by reform. The second refers 
to the large or small magnitude of the reform in any given area. Four combinations stem from these 
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 For a discussion from a political economy perspective, see Tommasi & Velasco 1996, 204-208; Rodrik 2016. 
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 As Stiglitz (2000, 572-573) notes, “all too often, the reform agenda overreached: it included elements that were not 
central to the immediate problems of the country, and indeed, behind which there was not even consensus within the 
economics profession […]. In many cases, the reforms went well beyond what was required to address the crisis, into 
longer term structural issues; the issues certainly needed addressing, but not without a more democratic strategy of 
building understanding and support for structural reforms.” 
38
 His ‘message’ is: 1. Do not introduce policies which may not be maintained, no matter how attractive these policies are in 
principle. 2. Do not change policies which are perfectly sustainable, no matter how costly they may seem in terms of 
resource misallocation. 3. Finally, in choosing among policies, give priority to those that enhance the stability of the 
overall policy environment (Rodrik 1990, 943). Also, Stiglitz 2000. 
Policy conditionality, structural adjustment and the domestic policy system. Conceptual framework and research agenda 
17 
two dimensions. Among them, the most compatible with sustainability is a large reform in a narrow 
area (Rodrik 1990, 943). 
In other words, focus and prioritization make better use of the available resources and should guide 
the design of structural adjustment programmes. “Casting too wide a net increases the danger of 
contamination across policy areas when some of the reforms get into difficulty; broad objectives also 
increase the demands on the few available policy instruments. Radical reform in a narrow range of 
policies is an appropriate compromise” (Rodrik 1990, 944). A similar argument is made by Wildavsky 
(1987, 3): “The larger each policy grows in its own sector, the more it insinuates itself into the 
manmade environment with which we must contend.”39 These concerns are not unknown to the 
institutions practicing conditionality, which are at times seen as moving towards more selectivity, a 
less intrusive form of conditionality (Nelson 1996, 1552). However, the way the representatives of the 
lenders operate on the ground is a matter for empirical investigation. 
Overall, reform overload generates a social uncertainty which undermines the ‘reform tolerance’ 
level. Numerous simultaneous actions take place in a charged policy environment because of the 
parallel fiscal consolidation.
40
 Taken together, they are likely to interact in an adverse manner. Their 
interaction does not necessarily produce – as some seem to assume – a positive effect but rather a 
negative synergy effect. Reforms deployed simultaneously generate many fronts; then, independently 
of the prospective benefits, a generalized contest is likely to be the result of their interaction. 
This affects the ‘perception’ of costs and benefits (rather than the costs and benefits themselves); 
reforms that are expected to produce diffuse and long term benefits on the wider population are not 
understood and valued. Even worse, the atmosphere of generalized contest easily leads public opinion 
to a rather favourable stance towards interest groups that bear the immediate concentrated costs. 
Instead of gaining support to advance reforms, policy-makers are undermined in their capacity to 
persuade and build alliances. In reality, this is likely to favour vested interests which find allies in the 
wider population for the defence of the status quo. The government then suffers a double loss. 
From a policy transfer perspective, policy failure may be generally attributed to three significant 
factors (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000, 17): (i) uninformed transfer, (ii) incomplete transfer, and (iii) 
inappropriate transfer (differences between the economic, social, political and ideological contexts). 
To these factors a fourth one should be added: the process through which the transfer is expected to be 
integrated in the destination context. 
In the light of the above, while incomplete transfer is seen as a reason for policy failure, the very 
transfer by conditionality may provide an additional explanation. Reform cannot take place or survive 
by ignoring the political context and its constraints. Policy conditionality is confronted with the 
question of the reform conditions, the political realities, and the resources required for an appropriate 
reform strategy. 
Sufficiency of resources  
Policy implementation and sustainability of reform efforts require resources. This is even more true 
because of the social costs of structural reforms, especially in times of austerity. The more radical the 
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 “Building in failures from the beginning by seeking objectives that can’t be met is not justifiable, (…) unless pious words 
are a substitute for good deeds,” notes Wildavsky (1987, 23). 
40
 As Walter (2016, 844-845) notes, structural reforms are implemented in a context of painful internal devaluation 
implying “austerity (brought about by higher interest rates, public spending cuts, and tax increases) which in the short 
run, typically leads to higher unemployment, lower wages, asset price deflation, and recession. It is particularly costly 
when implemented in a macroeconomic environment that is weak to begin with, when the budget is already in deficit, 
and when the economic structures that structural reforms intend to liberalize are deeply entrenched. This creates huge 
political obstacles for democratically elected governments, and is therefore a strategy that these have found very difficult 
to implement.” 
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reforms are, in terms of the degree to which they change existing patterns of operation, the more 
demanding they are in terms of resources. Furthermore, time constraints are translated into heavier 
political constraints. And when reforms need public involvement some clear positive perspective is 
critical for their sustainability. The political momentum in favour of adjustment packages will not last 
if the package does not generate investment and growth within a reasonable time span, underlines 
Rodrik (1990, 936). 
Resources may be distinguished in two large sub-categories. The first is those of a ‘technical’ 
nature (e.g. organizational, managerial, expertise, infrastructure and sometimes financial resources).
41
 
Their importance seems self-evident. It needs to be underlined, however, that while structural reforms 
may be ‘expensive’ in terms of expertise, the mobilization of technical resources becomes difficult in a 
context of fiscal consolidation. 
The second is of a more political nature. More than the overemphasized ‘political will’ (Bird 1998; 
Thomas & Grindle 1990 etc.), it includes credibility, legitimacy and support for the government that 
implements unpopular reforms in the form of consensus, or at least tolerance. When time and financial 
resources are in low supply, as is typically the case under policy conditionality, the implementation 
and sustainability of reforms depend even more on the government’s political capital. It needs to 
convince, mobilize in support and generally absorb or amortize opposition. And inversely, these 
resources determine political and governmental stability, which is in turn a precondition for reform 
sustainability.
42
 
Since policy determines politics, it also defines the necessary mix of resources. Issues that reach 
the public arena require a different mix of resources to those contained within the bureaucracy.
43
 And 
these need to match the resources of opposing groups inside or outside government (e.g. ‘veto 
players’). The domestic dynamics generated by structural reforms in such conditions therefore need 
better understanding.
44
 
Creating multiple ownerships 
Lacking alternative sources of funding, governments (even reluctantly) commit to a policy 
conditionality agenda agreed with a lender of last resort. No government takes the responsibility of 
allowing a sovereign default lightly. It is something that would remain its hallmark together with its 
dramatic economic and social consequences. This is an important dimension of the asymmetrical 
relationship manifested in policy conditionality. The conditions under which the agreement is reached 
may nevertheless leave some doubts concerning the government’s capacity to implement it. In 
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 This is a conventional distinction. In many situations, technical resources may have a more or less political dimension. I 
focus rather on the political resources without forgetting that the provision of such resources may also have political 
aspects, e.g. the normative content of the expertise, the indirect influence of technical assistance etc. 
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 A tentative definition of sustainable reform is provided by Tommasi & Velasco (1996, 224). A reform is sustainable “if 
national elections have taken place since the beginning of the process and the election outcome has not caused 
backsliding. A reform is strongly sustainable if it has been pursued by governments of both the right and the left in the 
same country or if the reforming coalition has been ratified in at least two national elections. A ‘sustainable’ policy 
environment is one which … can continue in the foreseeable future and is perceived as stable by the private sector” 
(Rodrik 1990, 933). Unpredictability regarding future government policies leads to short termism, shortening of time 
horizons and inability to plan. 
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 A reaction in the public arena entails high stakes for the government which needs considerable resources to sustain the 
reform. It may threaten the stability of the government and its capacity to undertake further reforms. Reaction from 
bureaucracy means lower stakes for the government but requires a different type of resources to sustain the reform 
(competence and compliance of the bureaucracy) (Thomas and Grindle 1990, 1171-2). 
44
 Alexiadou (2013) highlights the interaction between the type of government and the type of trade union movement, 
which determines the success or failure of unpopular reforms. 
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principle, a government will not completely renege on its commitments. But there are many different 
cases that conform to this principle. 
Governments may be reform-minded. They may fully agree with the prescribed reforms and seize 
the opportunity to promote them. This does not eliminate the difficulties, obstacles or resistance to 
policies the implementation of which upsets existing structures in the economy and society. 
Governments may be over-optimistic concerning their own resources to implement the prescribed 
agenda. The reform process may prove difficult in practice or become increasingly difficult as larger 
parts of society are affected and as time passes without visible positive results. Policies may not have 
their intended effects or may have unintended effects. Governments cannot ignore these aspects. This 
is why the implementation of policy conditionality ‘lies on a knife edge’ (Bird 1998, 107).45 
Taking into account the restricted margin for manoeuvre that governments dispose of in such a 
context, it is not surprising that they may not be in a position to completely fulfil their commitments.
46
 
It is not excluded that they attempt to avoid, delay or water down difficult decisions.
47
 And, somewhat 
paradoxically, this is when conditionality becomes stricter and monitoring procedures more stringent. 
Instead of acknowledging difficulties and focusing on priority issues, conditionality tends to expand 
and become more inflexible. This has for decades been the reaction of the IMF to the failings of 
conditionality, even when realizing its limits (See, for example, IMF 2001-02). And this is where the 
terms ‘political will’ and ‘ownership’ come to its rescue. The very reference to ‘reform ownership’ 
after decades of practising policy conditionality shows that many unresolved challenges remain. 
Ownership is defined as “a willing assumption of responsibility for an agreed program of policies, 
by officials in a borrowing country who have the responsibility to formulate and carry out those 
policies, based on the understanding that the program is achievable and is in the country’s own 
interest” (IMF 2001c, 6). As Boughton & Mourmouras (2002, 4) note, important difficulties stem from 
such a concept: it is on a judgement, it is dynamic (changes in positions of officials over time) and 
there are many potential ‘owners.’ 
For a long time, policy conditionality was seen as creating ownership, because of its assumed 
impact on the incentive structure of policy-makers. More conditionality would create more 
commitment. This narrow cost/benefit understanding of the factors that determine a government’s 
behaviour was gradually reviewed. It was acknowledged that conditionality “is not conducive to 
ownership, cannot substitute for ownership or even undermines the very idea of ownership.”48 
However, this new understanding did not reach the practice of conditionality at the institutional level, 
i.e. technical teams and their political leaders. The more a programme faces implementation 
difficulties, the more the conditions attached become strict and demanding.
49
 The latest revisions of 
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 There may be governments who negotiate programmes with little intention of carrying them through. There may be 
others, where, although the intention is to implement the programme, the effects of the programme turn out to differ from 
what was expected, especially when costs prove to be higher. Then governments adjust their behaviour and non-
compliance may be the result (Bird 1998, 107). 
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 Governments need flexibility and time if they are to create conditions favourable to their reform initiatives. Thomas & 
Grindle underline that decision-makers may decide to forego initiating a significant change because reforms that fail can 
be worse than no reforms at all. They jeopardise future prospects for reform and unnecessarily squander resources (1990, 
1178). 
47
 “It is, therefore, far too common for the Fund to find that would-be borrowers prefer to use traditional macroeconomic 
policies to more intrusive measures of structural adjustment. Thus the borrowing member may not be prepared to accept 
enough structural components in its stand-by arrangement or, even if it signs on for them, may find ways to delay their 
implementation” (Polak 1991, 32).  
48
 The nature of conditionality affects the degree of ownership in important ways (Boughton & Mourmouras 2002, 7-8). 
49
 “When faced with difficulties in the implementation of a program, the Fund sought to gain credibility by resorting to the 
introduction of additional conditions” (Buira 2003, 16). 
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conditionality (IMF 2012a) confirm such lasting practice, despite efforts at introducing some 
flexibility, and fewer and more focused conditions with clear prioritisation. 
Lack of (country) ownership is the generic summary explanation of failing conditionality, i.e. 
insufficient implementation of the reforms prescribed. The blame goes to the ‘catch all culprit’ of 
political will (Thomas & Grindle 1990, 1164) and domestic policy-makers (Paloni & Zanardi 2006, 
282). However, political commitment, political will or the rather vague concept of ‘ownership’ 
constitute an ‘inadequate’ or ‘tautological explanation’ of the poor record of programmes, since they 
do not analyse the determinants of the degree of political commitment (Bird 1998, 90-91). This 
oversimplifies (ibid.) and lacks operational content (Boughton & Mourmouras 2002). The term 
ownership has been so “used and abused that it now is at best unhelpful and at worst misleading and 
obfuscating” (Buiter 2007, 651). 
The use of ‘country ownership’ lacks precision concerning its target. Given the heterogeneity of 
views and interests, can it refer to a whole society? Although the answer to this is left unclear, it seems 
that it is primarily addressed to a government, as the most visible and responsible policy institution. 
However, as mentioned above, besides the finance ministry and its officials, other ministers, the 
central bank, NGOs, labour and business organizations, civil society etc. are in some way or another 
involved in the implementation process. How realistic is it to expect that everyone or even a critical 
mass provides a lasting agreement on the conditionality agenda?
 
 
Furthermore, contrary to its current use, ownership is not an all-inclusive concept in terms of actors 
and policies. It instead refers to the creation of the sufficient and appropriate alliances for each and 
every reform, which will include different sets and configurations of actors. ‘Programme ownership’ 
can only refer to the sum of multiple reform ownerships. This ‘plural’ approach to ownership exhibits 
the complexities hidden in the ‘black box’ of domestic policy dynamics described by ‘ownership.’ It 
also highlights the likelihood of negative interaction between the numerous parallel reforms on the 
conditionality agenda on the one hand and the necessary resources on the other, among which are 
political legitimacy and support. 
In short, ‘ownership’ seems to reflect the clash between a technocratic rationale and the political 
constraints on the ground seen as ‘noise’ to be done away with. Ownership then becomes a convenient 
technocratic argument that neither calls into question the design of the programme nor takes into 
consideration the conditions for its implementation. This is probably why, more and more, the 
expression ‘programme implementation progress’ is replaced by the term ‘compliance.’ 
Conviction and capacity 
‘Ownership’ is too problematic a concept to explain what really happens on the ground. To the extent 
that it is not simply a synonym for compliance, an alternative view is needed. Unpacking the idea of 
‘ownership’ meets the basic determinants of a government’s stance towards policy conditionality 
requirements. Two dimensions need to be considered, which may be seen as encompassing various 
other parameters: (a) the conviction that the conditionality programme is the right remedy and (b) the 
capacity to implement it, mainly in terms of political resources. 
In other words, 
(i) a government may be convinced that the prescribed policies are the right ones and may 
estimate that it has the necessary capacity and resources to implement them. Or,  
(ii) it may disagree and doubt its capacity to achieve them but has no alternative. 
There are also intermediate cases where: 
(iii) it lacks the capacity to implement although it accepts the advantages of the conditional 
policies, or  
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(iv) it is not convinced about their merits even if it would have the capacity. In any case, 
conviction and capacity are a matter of degree. 
 
(a) Conviction 
From the way it is used, ‘ownership’ seems to refer primarily to conviction, i.e. to a fundamental 
agreement that prescribed policies are appropriate and necessary. The ‘logic of appropriateness’ 
relates to a ‘learning process’ that facilitates policy transfer (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2004, 
667). Governments that adopt them argue that the changes should have been undertaken long ago, on 
their own initiative. In this case, conditionality appears as the ally of reformist governments. To what 
extent this leads to successful implementation needs to take into account the second aspect, namely 
capacity (infra). 
Poor implementation may reflect lack of conviction that the prescribed policies are appropriate. 
However, agreement or disagreement with the policies prescribed may not necessarily refer to the 
whole agenda. This links to the above-mentioned ‘multiple ownerships’ argument. Some of the 
prescribed policies may be seen as appropriate and some not. Moreover, disagreement may not 
concern the objectives but the timing or the means to achieve the reforms and their estimated effects.
50
 
Frictions may also arise from the monitoring processes and techniques. In other words, it is rather 
simplistic to refer to the conditionality agenda as a whole and as fully appropriate by definition. If 
ownership refers to the gap between a government’s unconstrained preferred policy and that preferred 
by the IFIs (Bird 1998, 104), this gap needs to be empirically assessed in terms of its size on a case-
by-case basis, taking into account the above-mentioned aspects. 
Last but not least, conviction may be enhanced depending on the results achieved within a 
reasonable time frame. When there are not positive but instead adverse effects (e.g. on unemployment 
or on growth and with a contraction of the economy) which do not match prior expectations, 
conviction cannot be sustained. Inversely, visible improvements encourage conviction and provide 
policy-makers with arguments in favour of continuing reforms, at least for a certain time. 
(b) Capacity 
Capacity, especially in terms of the political resources required, is an important condition for the 
promotion of a series of basically unpopular reforms. In difficult times, such as those that bring a 
country to seek conditional lending, political resources are by definition scarce, fragile and volatile. 
Even reform-minded governments which have to operate in such a constrained policy space, amidst 
many parallel unsettling and unpopular reforms, may not have enough political resources to overcome 
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 As Bird (1998, 104-105) observes, “the costs may not relate to the design of economic policy in broad terms but to the 
specific quantification of policy in terms of preconditions and performance criteria, which again create the impression of 
subservience to the IFIs and (…) increases the extent to which the IFIs intrude in policy formulation.” Furthermore, costs 
evolve over time, they are dynamic: while they were formerly uncertain they may become certain and therefore carry 
greater weight. 
 Buira (2003) directly links time, financing, type of conditionality, commitment and the success of the programme. “Since 
structural adjustments will normally require greater amounts of financing over an extended period of time than demand 
management alone, the type of adjustment policies to be followed will often give rise to policy differences and tensions 
between the Fund and the member country. … Thus the nature of the imbalance, the amount of support and the duration 
of the adjustment process will be issues for discussion and negotiation between the authorities of the member country and 
the Fund. … the answers given by the Fund to these and other questions, as embedded in the program, frequently 
determine whether the conditionality applied in a particular case is seen as appropriate or as too severe and whether the 
authorities will be committed to the success of the program. The adjustment of an imbalance is not simply an economic 
problem, but one that will usually have significant social and political repercussions.” 
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such difficulties and persist.
51
 Political and governmental instability is a likely result. Even 
governments initially elected with high majorities and enjoying wide acceptance are sooner or later 
exhausted. Ownership is both dynamic and fragile, note Boughton and Mourmouras (2002, 19). Both 
conviction and capacity are dynamic categories that interact and may change with time and political 
conditions (change of government, no sight of positive results, ‘reform fatigue’ etc.). 
It is important to underline that ‘capacity’ is not defined in absolute terms. It instead reflects the 
above-mentioned relation between the government’s resources (which may vary over time) and the 
difficulties in the policy environment shaped by policy conditionality and its requirements. The more 
restricted the policy environment is, the more political resources are needed. As explained above, time 
and timing are important resources in policy-making in many respects. The less time is available the 
more political capital is needed. A new government in the initial stages of a programme is likely to 
show more commitment. However, the political capital of a genuinely reformist government may soon 
be exhausted under the time pressure, restricted policy space and a lack of positive results in sight.
52
 In 
this context, the argument that conditionality tips the balance of power in favour of reform-minded 
governments (Bird 2009) may appear weak. The difficult environment within which they have to 
operate is likely to point to the opposite. 
Political capital is not a passive inalienable quantity. It is dynamic and can easily evaporate, 
something that not only threatens the stability of government but also the sustainability of reforms. 
Thus, strict conditionality, which assumes that it can basically rely on the government’s capacity to 
promote prescribed reforms, is very likely to lead to a waste of political capital and also of 
opportunities. Attention needs to be paid to domestic political dynamics in order to prevent them from 
jeopardizing reforms.
53
 
Appropriate design 
Implementation is a complex and dynamic political process. Its success depends on a series of factors 
(Hogwood & Gunn 1984, 198-206), some of which concern the formally preceding stages. In other 
words, there is a connection between the policy formulation stage on the one hand and implementation 
conditions on the other. “Policies imply theories (…) they point to a chain of causation between initial 
conditions and future consequences” (Pressman & Wildavsky 1973, xv). 
Every policy is based on assumptions relating causes and effects, and the motivations and 
incentives regarding those it intends to influence. Their accuracy and realism are put to test in the 
implementation stage. This link is one of the keys to the ‘capacity’ to implement. Bringing capacity 
into play ex post in order to explain gaps and deficiencies seems to be rather a theoretical exercise. 
Difficulties and resistance can be anticipated. If the objective is to encourage reform, considerations of 
capacity (including type, volume and mobilization of resources) need to be assessed in relation to the 
expected difficulties and should be integrated into the design of policy conditionality. This is how the 
conditions of implementation can be prepared and therefore the intended outcome of policy reform 
influenced – as one important factor among others.  
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 As Polak (1991, 32-35) points out, “not all governments are able to marshal a sufficiently strong coalition of broad 
segments of the population that can be expected to benefit from structural adjustment measures and from the avoidance 
of excessive reliance on demand-management policies.” 
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 The political momentum in favour of adjustment packages will not last if the package does not generate investment and 
growth within a reasonable time span (Rodrik 1990, 936). 
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 “The political process can be viewed as a dynamic game. Actions taken in one period may affect coalition formation and 
therefore the set of admissible reforms at a later stage. (…) Perhaps the most important part of the political process of 
reform in democratic societies is the creation of political support for the reform” (Stiglitz 2000, 571). “As long as there is 
not consideration of the policy process underpinning the implementation of conditionality, the result will be ‘misallocated 
resources, wasted political capital and frustration” (Thomas and Grindle 1990, 1178). Also see Brawley and Baerg 2007. 
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The design needs to also take into account the interaction among simultaneous reforms and adjust 
their timing. Synergy is far from being an automatic effect of parallel reforms. An overburdened 
agenda of unpopular policies, time pressure and a restricted policy environment may exceed the (or 
any) government’s capacity.54 
These concerns seem to be absent from the conditionality agenda, although in various ways on 
multiple occasions and using different terms their importance has been underlined by various authors 
(including by IMF researchers). Boughton & Mourmouras (2002, 6), for instance, recommend looking 
more into the heterogeneity of interests in the country. This would contribute to designing 
programmes appropriately, especially when they include major structural reforms which may 
inevitably have a concentrated negative impact on some sectoral interests. Bird (1998, 107-108) 
directly confronts the issue: “Modifications to the design of conditionality need in the first instance to 
narrow the gap between a government’s preferred policies and those favoured by the IFIs.” Among 
other things, a clearer appreciation by the IFIs of the distributional, and therefore the political, 
dimensions, of their preferred programmes could improve their implementation. He concludes that 
programmes need to be well-designed in terms of addressing the appropriate issues, their internal 
consistency, the appropriate sequencing and not being over-ambitious. 
While implementation is a process with formal and informal aspects, policy conditionality seems to 
turn a blind eye to process. Boughton & Mourmouras (2002, 19-21) emphasize that process is likely to 
generate ‘ownership’ by giving the authorities of the borrower country as much flexibility and 
empowerment as possible. This includes greater control over the agenda, building a relation of trust 
and helping nourish domestic coalitions for reform. For Nelson (1996, 1558), broader participation 
and consultation could contribute to accelerated learning, heightened responsibility and self-respect, 
and better communication and coordination within the government and between it and other groups. It 
can also facilitate implementation even if the proposals generated in this way are less than optimal 
from a technical perspective. Although it may not bring harmony, such a shift is constructive since it 
“substitutes explicit disagreement over substantive issues at a time when they may be constructively 
resolved for submerged resentments and disagreements expressed in delay, erosion and obfuscation in 
the course of implementation” (ibid.). 
In any case, the implementation gap is easier to observe than the accurateness and appropriateness 
of the design of a reform programme, which require a second-level analysis. This probably explains 
why ‘poor implementation’ and ‘insufficient commitment or ownership’ are commonly advanced as 
the obvious explanations for policy failures. 
* 
Before concluding: Who governs? 
Conditionality as a policy instrument intervenes in the domestic governance process with the intention 
to guide it. In doing so, it manifests an underlying clash between a deeply technocratic approach to 
policy reform and its political prerequisites.  
Given its previously-described weight on the domestic policy process, a broader issue needs to be 
addressed. This has to do with the relation of the political and policy system to its social environment 
and the issues of sovereignty, legitimacy and accountability. Drazen (2002, 4), for instance, places 
IMF conditionality in the context of the relation to its sovereign members. Conditionality is viewed as 
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 The design of conditionality and its relation to ownership have been analysed from an economic point of view. The 
various analyses may more or less stress the economic or political aspects of the issue. See, for example, Paloni, Alberto 
& Zanardi 2006; Boughton and Mourmouras 2002; Rodrik 1990; Bird 1998, 2001, etc. 
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‘imposing conditions’ on a country in a way that infringes on its national sovereignty.55 The reforms 
typically appear to be imposed by outsiders in return for the loans, underlines Rodrik (1990, 936). 
An investigation into the formative symbolic events and attitudes towards domestic authorities, which 
are often reproduced and amplified by the media, would show the sensitivity of public opinion to this 
issue and the fragility of any governmental effort to ‘create domestic ownership.’ How are the 
prescribed policies perceived by domestic constituencies and society in general? How and to what 
extent does a government have room to initiate the required policies as its own? Who sets and revises 
the targets to be achieved? Who announces the programme and its requirements? How are subsequent 
issues put on the agenda? These questions have to do with processes, methods and incidents that shape 
social perceptions regarding the question of who governs. 
The issue of sovereignty is not just a formality. Through conditionality, lenders exercise strong 
leverage as a means to bring a borrowing country in line with macro-economic and structural 
requirements. Thus, policy conditionality constitutes a ‘cross-level issue’, a symbol of the encounter 
between the supra-national (international financial institutions, representatives of the lenders and the 
EU) and the national (borrower country) with the ensuing contradictions regarding the norms, 
processes and concerns that prevail at each level. 
In this process, the questions of democracy and accountability need to be addressed. Are 
technocratic requirements beyond democratic scrutiny? Who is accountable to the population for mis-
targeting, mistakes, negative unintended outcomes and legacies the costs of which are to be borne by 
society? 
At the conceptual level, accountability includes a normative argument, namely that elements of 
conditionality can be challenged by different domestic constituencies in terms of process as well as in 
terms of outcome. Indeed, it is likely to be challenged through various means, either institutionally 
(elections, parliament, courts, the media) or by social mobilization in civil society. Since policy 
conditionality constrains the margin of alternatives and the policy space of the government, 
responsiveness to both is limited, although often to different degrees. Accountability lines tend to shift 
away from domestic society and towards the representatives of the creditors, with the accountability 
relation between domestic policy-makers and society being critically weakened. As a result, trust in 
government is eroded. 
Generally, EU decision-making and globalisation processes reduce the power of governments to 
determine outcomes for which they are nationally accountable (Rose 2014). However, as shown 
above, the impact of conditionality surpasses what is implied by these contextual pressures. 
Governments are caught between two ‘masters’ in an era of ‘constrained choice’ (Laffan 2014). 
Any government in a democracy needs to maintain a level of legitimacy and to be open to 
accountability. Otherwise, its political capital is quickly eroded. Unless there is a visible positive 
result, it is unlikely that the next government will be able to survive the same conditions. That it is an 
emergency situation is an argument likely to work for a certain amount of time, but it has limits of 
persuasion. 
The argument that the need to borrow de facto restrains national sovereignty seems a pragmatic 
acknowledgment of an asymmetrical power relation but it can be dangerous in normative terms.
56
 It 
also unveils a lack of cognizance of modern democratic standards (legitimacy, accountability) as well 
as of the requirements for successful implementation (effectiveness). The transformation of a whole 
policy-making system into a mere implementation mechanism does not go without consequences. It 
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 “Hence, use of conditionality is not simply a question of prudent economic behaviour, but a potentially politically 
charged question of the proper relation of the IMF to its members” (Drazen 2002, 4). 
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 “Conditionality is obviously not good from the standpoint of democracy or national sovereignty. ... the justification of the 
EAPs was not democracy in Europe. It was debt...” observes Geer (2014, 52). 
Policy conditionality, structural adjustment and the domestic policy system. Conceptual framework and research agenda 
25 
further reveals that conditionality constitutes a ‘mega policy instrument’ with an aspiration to 
substitute a domestic governance system. 
Returning to the main question of this paper, i.e. the reform capacity of policy conditionality, the 
proposed conclusion is that it is limited. Although the external pressure may act as a beneficial factor, 
i.e. making political systems confront their own deficiencies, one can wonder how much is possible 
from the ‘outside.’ Domestic dynamics deserve a closer examination. Conditionality has time, scope 
and political limitations. Its influence tends to fade after the decision-making stage, while 
implementation conditions and constraints seem to be ignored. Its negative side-effects may 
undermine its reform potential. Above all, it cannot avoid the bias of being part of a loan agreement, 
which orients its rationale, priorities, methods and processes. Applying a policy lens to domestic 
policy conditionality implementation may therefore prove a rich research endeavour. 
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